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Too Little, Too Late: How the Government could have prevented the fall of Arthur Andersen
By Justin Miller
Arthur Andersen's accounting fraud, later
costing investors and corporations billions in losses,
could have been stopped had adequate governmental
regulations been in place to uphold the quality
auditing of corporations. Auditing is the outside
accountant's main responsibility: double checking
financial statements to verify a company's status.
Any failure to uphold quality accounting warrants a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
investigation, and legislation should be enacted to stop
repeated examples of accounting malevolence.

partnerships. This practice was continued through the
early Nineties. Though strong leadership had made
the firm a global accounting giant, it grew so fast it
lost sight of its humble beginnings out of greed
(Squires 73, 77, 89).
Weak Regulation Lays Foundation for Deceit
Investment groups and stock brokers watch
earnings statements of corporations and will only buy
if favorable economic gains are on the horizon.
Arthur Andersen misstated financial statements and
neglected its auditing responsibilities to augment
positive earnings reports for the corporations it
represented. Auditing successful companies on the
rise meant greater financial success for Andersen
itself. Thus, this cycle of greed led to more profit and
more greed. Andersen lost sight of its responsibility
to the investing public and was willing to deceive
investors for its own financial profit (Letters f 3). The
company began to hire employees of similar
personality types, often referred to as Andersen
Androids. They specifically hired young, quiet, noncombatant workers who would pose the smallest
chance of blowing the whistle on the firm's scams
(Squires 125).

Many are familiar with Arthur Andersen's
fraudulent partnership with Enron and WorldCom as
they were major news stories that received
tremendous media coverage. However, the list of
companies that Andersen improperly audited is
lengthy and dates back to the early Nineties (Squires
113). The public is largely unaware of this early
deception because, for example, when Arthur
Andersen allowed the books to misrepresent the
financial picture of the Baptist Foundation of Arizona,
(BFA). The BFA eventually settled their lawsuit
without being fully punished (Bartlett v. Andersen 1
9).
Andersen's fraudulent partnerships piled up
into crescendo of corporate deceit. Legislation like
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in response to Enron
and WorldCom, should have been passed after the
BFA scandal.
Self-regulation in the accounting
industry failed miserably at stopping Andersen's
deceit. Effective legislation would have curtailed
some of the worst examples of corporate fraud this
country has ever seen.

America needed the SEC to step up its watch of
accounting practices and corporate fraud, but the
government standard in the Nineties was ineffectual.
It merely called for various small organizations like
the Public Oversight Board. Such organizations were
known as Self-Regulating Groups because the
accounting industry was and had been a selfregulating industry for decades. These groups took on
much of the power that the SEC should have claimed.
The SEC's limited powers were set up so that the
government could limit the amount of bureaucracy
given to the Securities and Exchange Commission
upon its establishment. This move proved to be a
multi-billion dollar mistake.

An Overview of Andersen
Arthur Andersen was formed in 1913, and "for
89 years it was the mainstay of the accounting
profession holding a reputation for honesty and
trustworthiness" (Squires 10). In the Eighties it was
so dominant that the eight major accounting firms
were known as Arthur Andersen and the Seven
Dwarfs (Squires 5).
Just before the collapse,
Andersen had offices in 350 cities worldwide and was
previously known as the "Marine Corps of
Accounting," for their quality audits and good
reputation (Arthur ^ 1, Fowler f 20). It employed
85,000 and worked for some 100,000 clients (Arthur f
1, Ex-Andersen ^ 1). Somewhere down the line
Andersen strayed from its reputable beginnings,
turning unethical and greedy.

A number of specific examples of corporate
accounting fraud led to the demise of Arthur
Andersen. Throughout five examples the government
did not do enough to prevent future auditing fraud.
Rather, the government followed a policy of
appeasement philosophy and merely fined Arthur
Andersen and was foolish enough to believe the
firm's, "promise not to repeat the behavior" (Fowler f
18).
Sunbeam
Going bankrupt in 1998, the Sunbeam
Corporation and its auditor Arthur Andersen were the
epitome of mismanagement. This first example of

The immediate cause of the shift in ethics came
after a period of sixty years. The leadership of Harvey
Kapnick grossly expanded Andersen's size through
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have stuck it out in court rather than concede $200
million, and ended the investigation.
13,000
grandmothers and grandfathers were duped into
investing their retirement funds so that BFA and
Andersen would gain financially. Andersen knew the
scheme was unethical and illegal, but neglected its
duties as an auditor for increased profit. In the end,
Andersen was never truly brought to justice. It had
reimbursed the investors for some of the money they
had failed to protect, but this punishment was not a
deterrent for future scandal.

accounting fraud and restated earnings was so bad that
the SEC had to step in and curtail the partnership of
CEO "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap and Andersen (Sunbeam
| 1, Squires 120). Together they misappropriated
funds and misstated accounting books to make it seem
like the appliance manufacturer was rebounding after
a few bad years (Sunbeam f 6). Going beyond its
negligent role in the BFA scandal, Andersen now
readily took part in the accounting fraud for the sake
of its own increased revenues. It shredded documents
that would have incriminated both Andersen and
Sunbeam executives. The SEC finally stepped in after
bankruptcy was filed. This was only after Andersen
helped the company fraudulently misstate $189
million (Settlement f 5).

Waste Management
Arthur Andersen had been partners with Waste
Management, Inc. for three decades without legal
troubles. However, the Nineties led to greed on both
sides of the partnership that ended in SEC settlements.
Since no strong accounting fraud deterrents were in
place, billions of dollars were dishonestly misstated.
Former
Andersen
employees
were
Waste
Management top financial executives and also many
incriminating documents vanished (Squires 120).
Tragically, this was only the third-largest instance of
accounting fraud in which Arthur Andersen was the
audit partner. Signing off on a $1 billion income
overstatement and veiling $1.7 billion worth of
liabilities over six years, the SEC finally stepped in to
stop the corruption (Squires 121).

In Bankruptcy Court, Andersen paid only $110
million to the shareholders of the company it was
financially corrupting (Settlement f 7). The SEC
investigated Andersen for the first time in what would
later prove to be their final years, yet failed to bring
them to adequate justice (Squires 119). The legal
consequences in two consecutive scandals hardly
could bring them down. The absence of a strong
enforcer of the already weak accounting regulations in
regards to auditor fraud was the direct reason for
Andersen's numerous scandals. They were breaking
the law, profiting, and paying minimal fees if and
when they were discovered. Greed was rampant and
the opportunity to make more fraudulent money was
out there. There are many other partnerships in which
Andersen definitely took advantage of that
opportunity.

The Securities and Exchange Commission, as
we have seen, is quite good at beginning its
investigations.
Executing justice based on its
findings, however, is a different story. Out of court
settlements were the only consequences Andersen
faced in three consecutive massive accounting
scandals. After six years of greedy accounting fraud,
Andersen was fined a mere $7 million (Squires 120).
The SEC failed to bring criminal obstruction of justice
charges against Andersen. It had only warned the firm
that "if it were ever involved in a similar case, the
consequences would be more severe" (Squires 119).
Blatantly neglecting its own duty to prosecute Arthur
Andersen, the SEC issued a $7 million dollar fine and
a warning (Squires 120). Warnings do not deter future
scandal they merely facilitate the opportunity for it to
arise. At last, the SEC had sufficient evidence to take
down Andersen before it did more to hurt American
corporations, yet they failed miserably. Blame for the
Enron scandal, the next "similar case," falls partly
upon the lax implementation of punishment by the
SEC (Squires 120).

Arizona Baptists
Andersen's next illegal accounting scam dealt
with the Baptist Foundation of Arizona. Serving as
BFA's auditor, Andersen failed to realize the company
was running a "Ponzi" investment scheme (Bartlett v.
Andersen H 1). Such a scheme involved pooling the
individual retirement account balances of some 13,000
elderly people into a fraudulent pyramid (Squires
117). The money from new investors was used to pay
off older investors but BFA and Andersen got a cut of
the profit. After five years of scandal the BFA filed
for bankruptcy when its scheme ran out of investors.
The SEC was nowhere to be found, but smaller
agencies like the Arizona Board of Accountancy
eventually stepped in to review financial statements
(Squires 118).
Andersen claimed to know nothing about the
"Ponzi" scheme, yet in March 2001, it settled out of
court after the BFA sued them for misstating the
accounting books (Bartlett v. Arizona f 2). How
much did Andersen agree to pay in a case where it
admits no wrongdoing? $217 million was ordered to
be paid to millions of investors (Squires 118). If it
had nothing to hide, the Andersen legal team would

Enron
The Houston energy titan was the ninth largest
corporation in America right before all the document
shredding had begun (Squires 127). David Duncan
led Arthur Andersen's audit of the Enron Corporation.
Personally choosing his audit team, Duncan knew that
21
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shambles (Ex-Andersen | 1). Top executives were
jailed, and it was fined yet again. Finally, after many
scandals throughout the past Nineties, "The
government decided Andersen's record was too
egregious to ignore, so they treated it as a repeat
offender. The negotiations failed and Andersen was
indicted" (Fowler f 19).
Their later Enron punishment was a $500,000
fine and five-years of probation (Fowler f 1).
However, the government failed to shut Arthur
Andersen down. The SEC was on the right track
getting closer to stopping Andersen, yet would be
duped yet again.
After Enron it allowed this
repeatedly unethical firm to have one last chance to
deceive investors and to break the law. While the
Grand Jury was indicting them for obstruction of
justice at Enron, another larger scandal was about to
erupt.

in Enron he would be, "handling a potential time
bomb" (Squires 127). Enron was a much larger
corporation than those previously discussed in this
report. Thus, it entailed even more corruption. Enron
in the late Nineties was in a constant state of forming
partnerships with smaller Special Purpose Entities.
These "off-the-books" partnerships were a way to
boost financial statements.
Enron's SPEs were
illegitimate because they were not true partnerships.
Enron owned nearly all the shares of their 3,500 SPEs,
in nearly every case more than the 97% that was
allowed by law (Squires 9). Andersen overlooked its
duties to the investing public and signed off on these
partnerships (Letters f 3). It could do this because the
government did not have adequate accounting
regulations in place.
The main corporate fraud of Enron is
analogously explained by Margaret Ceconi, a former
Enron employee. She states, "Say you have a food
company that makes both hot dogs and ice cream.
The hot dog stand is making money, and the ice cream
stand is losing money. So the company puts the ice
cream losses on the profitable hot dog books...since
the ice cream stand and the hot dog stand have the
same owner, is this legal?" (Squires 9)
Such a practice is most definitely illegal, the
only legal practice would be to keep two sets of books
and transfer some funds from hot dog to ice cream
stand. However, Andersen allowed Enron to do the
illegal version of the practice repeatedly.
For
example, Andersen allotted $1 billion in losses onto
just one of the SPEs in which Enron owned more than
the legal 97% interest in. Andersen also failed to stop
Enron when they sold so-called "energy contracts"
which were actually illegitimate loans (Squires 9).
This deception worked for Andersen until 2001.
The first-quarter earnings did not match the
accounting books and people began to question the
Enron-Andersen partnership. On October 16th Enron
absorbed a one-time loss of $1 billion and admitted it
had not stated $618 million in loses (Squires 8).
Immediately in an all-night frenzy of paper shredding
and electronic deletion, Andersen strove to wipe out
the records of accounting fraud that dated back years
(Letters ^| 2). Its actions were similar to the Sunbeam
case that it obstructed in the investigation of what
happened at Enron. This time they would not be so
lucky.
The ensuing SEC investigation into Enron was
halted due to destroyed evidence. Arthur Andersen
and mainly David Duncan's auditing team were
criminally charged with obstruction of justice (Fowler
^ 9). He would later go to jail and Andersen's market
reputation was critically weakened (Squires 5).
Arthur Andersen was initially forced to pay only $40
million and was trying to negotiate its way out of
well-deserved punishment, but its firm was in

WorldCom
St. Louis telecommunications giant WorldCom
"prove[d] to be the final nail in the coffin," for its
auditor Arthur Andersen (Treanor ^ 1). WorldCom
filed for bankruptcy in 2002, making it the largest
U.S. filing in history—dwarfing that of Enron. Arthur
Andersen withheld crucial financial statements for
years leading up to the bankruptcy. After admitting to
misstating $3.85 billion, the SEC investigated just
how much of a suspected $408 million in loans was
part of a cover-up. Obviously not learning anything
and acting out of greed, Andersen auditors looked the
other way as debts were underscored and assets were
upgraded (Associated f 7). Andersen withheld crucial
accounting figures to increase the revenues it gained
from consulting and started to shred documents once
again before it was caught. The destruction ended in
August 2002 when the firm had lost its license to audit
on the market (Fowler 1 12). The SEC had finally
caught up with the elusive Arthur Andersen, and the
firm completely crumbled in the wake of their
investigation into WorldCom (Associated f 3, Squires
149).
Immediate Changes
It took more than five years and over five
billion dollars in scandalous accounting before the
American Government stopped Arthur Andersen.
This travesty, however, led to changes in our legal
stance on corporate fraud. President George W. Bush
immediately increased the SEC's budget after the
Enron Scandal (Squires 150). A 77% augmentation,
$766 million annually would go towards stopping
future malevolence. In 2002, William H. Donaldson
was named the new head of the Commission. He
plans to upgrade the technology and hire a
significantly larger legal staff in the hope of restoring
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five years unable to curtail their fraudulent accounting
practices.
At least stronger legislation has finally been
implemented, and Arthur Andersen is no more. Still,
one can only hope that another rogue accounting firm
in the future does not exploit the government in the
future. Upon researching the Andersen accounting
scandal one asks themselves a profound question on
commerce.
Does greed make fraud inevitable?
Perhaps, yet it is up to the government to step in and
punish corporations and protect investors and the
economy.

investor confidence to the American public (Squires
151).
Throwing money at the problem, however, will
not deter any future scandals. The real reforms came
in the passing of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Davis
16). Sarbanes-Oxley was a direct response to Enron
and WorldCom, finally ensuring quality auditing for
all publicly held companies (Squires 151). An
extremely concise summary involves an actual auditor
combining forces with the CEO, CFO, and a five
member board of CPAs and outside attorneys (for
example, the District Attorneys). All five will take on
greater responsibilities and their work will be
overseen by a new organization (Davis 16).
Replacing the old self-regulatory ways of the
accounting industry, Sarbanes-Oxley set up the Public
Company Oversight Board, or PCOB (Squires 151).
Finally the government has established reputable
authorities in the accounting industry that could help
the auditing process. All of the failures of the past
five years may be prevented from happening in the
near future (Davis 16).
Was Andersen's Fraud Destined to Happen?
The rebuttal to the belief that the Government
failed to stop Andersen before nearly all investor
confidence had been shaken is that there was nothing
the government could have done.
Accounting
legislation similar to Sarbanes-Oxley might never
have been passed after, for example, Sunbeam,
because it was not urgent. We know that new laws
often fail to even reach the Congress and if they do,
deliberation on issues can take months at a time.
Perhaps a post-Enron Sarbanes-Oxley is something we
should be glad to have had passed at all. Necessity to
establish accounting regulations in the wake of Enron
may have been the only thing that would've ever
caused the law to be enacted.
Was the fraud inevitable?
The once ultra-reputable Arthur Andersen had
lost almost a century's worth of its respect in the
accounting world in less than one fraudulent decade.
The greed of Arthur Andersen led it to repeatedly
break the ethics of accounting and law. The American
government allowed this fraud to happen while the
self-regulating accounting industry could not bring
down this rogue firm. From the Arizona Baptists to
WorldCom, Andersen had ripped through the
confidence of many American investors for over five
years.
Billions of dollars were lost by both
shareholders and employees. Not enough had been
done to stop Andersen before Enron; because too little
authority had been placed in the hands of the POB and
the SEC. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted much
too late—we allowed many of Andersen's rampant
misdeeds to continue far too long and were for over

23
https://fisherpub.sjf.edu/ur/vol7/iss1/6

4

Miller: Too Little, Too Late

Works Cited
"Arthur Andersen." Hoovers Online. 2003. Hoovers
Online. Lavery Lib., St. John Fisher. 12
October. 2003.
<http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2870/subscribe/>.
Associated Press "WorldCom is Filing For
Bankruptcy." St. Louis Post - Dispatch. 22
July, 2002. PA Researcher II; ProQuest. Lavery
Lib., St. John Fisher. 14 November. 2003
<http://libdb.sjfc.edu>
Davis, Jenny B. "Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley." ABA
Journal (February 2003): 16.
"Ex-Andersen Firms Will Pay $40 Million Enron
Settlement." The New York Times. 15 July
2003. Infotrac. Gale Group. Lavery Lib., St.
John Fisher. 12 October. 2003. <http://infotrac.
thomsonlearning. com/>.
Fowler, Tom and Flood, Mary. "Arthur Andersen
gets the maximum sentence." 16 October 2002.
Houston Chronicle. Houston Chronicle. 2
December. 2003. <http://www.chron.com/cs/
CD A/story .hts/special/andersen/1619985>.
"Letters to the Editor: Enron Blame Still Belongs At
the Accountants' Feet." Wall Street Journal.
21 August 2003. PA Researcher II; ProQuest.
Lavery Lib., St. John Fisher. 12 October. 2003.
<http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2536/pqdweb?ReqType=
301 &UserId=IPAuto&Passwd=IPAuto&COPT
=RE JTPUc0& JSEnabled= 1 &TS= 1070832976>
Squires, Susan E. Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting
Values, Unexpected Consequences. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.
"Sunbeam Inquiry looks at Events of Dunlap's Time."
Wall Street Journal. September 10 2002. PA
Researcher II; ProQuest. Lavery Lib., St. John
Fisher. 12 October. 2003. <http://libdb.sjfc.
edu:2536/pqdweb?ReqType=301 &UserId=IPA
uto&Passwd=IPAuto&COPT=REJTPUc0&JSE
nabled= 1 &TS= 1070832976>.
"Sunbeam Settlement Reached; A Record SEC Fine
for Ex-CEO Dunlap." The Washington Post. 5
September 2002. PA Researcher II; ProQuest.
Lavery Lib., St. John Fisher. 31 November.
2003. <http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2536/pqdweb?
ReqType=301 &UserId=IPAuto&Passwd=IPAu
to&COPT=REJTPUcO&JSEnabled=l&TS=107
0832976>.

Treanor, Jill. "WorldCom Scandal: Accountants:
Grim Outlook for Andersen After Latest
Scandal: Disgraced Firm Faces Law Claims
and Break-Up." The Guardian. 27 June 2002.
PA Researcher II; ProQuest. Lavery Lib., St.
John Fisher. 13 October. 2003. <http://libdb.
sjfc.edu:2536/pqdweb?ReqType=301&UserId=
IPAuto&Passwd=IPAuto&COPT=REJTPUc0
&JSEnabled= 1 &TS= 1070832976>.
Tommie L. Bartlett v. Arthur Andersen. No. 0117327. U. S. District Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. 24 January. 2003.

24
Published by Fisher Digital Publications, 2004

5

